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Introduction
Just as in seventeenth and eighteenth century Great Britain and
America a few tracts and acts set precedents for print by which we
live today, so what we think and do today mar frame the information
system for a substantial period in the future.
Computer service bureaus represent a technological conglomeration
of print, broadcast, common carrier, community bulletin board, and
computer communications media. This technological nexus is central
to establishing a standard of liability for defamation suits against
computer service bureaus.2
The transformation of the various media into digital format and
the recent growth of various means of digitally transferring informa-
tion present a potential turning point for modern lawmaking? As
with the introduction of the printing press, these technological
changes are forcing a wholesale revision in the manner in which infor-
mation is conveyed.' With these changes, new players are emerging
with complex roles in the system of transferring information. 5 Com-
puter information services, for example, may be publishers, sellers,
and transmitters of their own and others' literary efforts. Because
these players assume multiple roles, their legal responsibility for tor-
tious use of their facilities is uncertain. Under existing law, the pub-
lisher's' duty is different from that of other sellers, archivists, or
common carriers.
Courts,' legislatures, and the parties themselves could use several
models to illustrate the legal responsibilities of commercial informa-
tion providers. The simplest approach is based on an analogy to the
distribution of printed matter and a theory of content control.6 For
several reasons, however, use of this analogy does not provide useful
answers to several of the basic problems presented.7 Most fundamen-
tally, it provides a perverse incentive for the host computer user to
take no action.
1. ITHIEL DE SOLA PooL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 10 (1983).
2. Robert Charles, Note, Computer Bulletin Boards and Defamation: Who Should Be
Liable? Under What Standard?, 2 J.L. & TECH. 121, 138 (1987).
3. The need to rethink legal doctrines is not uniform. Some torts, such as the use of
electronic media to defame, do not present any novel issues. I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper
Legal Regimefor "Cyberspace," 55 U. Prrr. L. REV. 993, 999-1000 (1994); Charles, supra
note 2, at 134-36..
4. POOL, supra note 1, at 23-54 (discussing the effects of computerization on the.
media).
5. For example, Compuserve, a large on-line service company, serves as content pro-
vider, content monitor, and pipeline, among other roles. Under traditional defamation
law, each of these roles has a different standard of liability. See infra notes 39-58 and
accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 59-76 and accompanying text.
7. Id.
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One alternative is to impose a single standard of liability on host
computer service providers.8 This approach, however, presents signif-
icant technical and practical problems.9 The one-size-fits-all rule that
has emerged from other suggested approaches, such as strict liability
or certain forms of negligence, cannot be practically or constitution-
ally applied.
A second alternative, suggested by the variation in regulation
among print, broadcast, and common carrier, is to approach the prob-
lem as a question of scarcity. As access to the means of. publication
becomes more widespread, the intermediary's responsibility in-
creases.'0 Again, however, there are serious problems with such an
approach." First, the scarcity rationale for regulation does not apply
when there are thousands of vendors. Second, the alternative ration-
ale for regulation-protection of captive audiences-does not apply
when the buyer chooses to access the service.
Solving the problem is contingent on balancing constitutional re-
quirements and policy, the need for stability and practicality, and a
concern for compensating real injuries. The solution these factors
suggest is a relatively high fault standard for host computer owners,
such as commercial bulletin boards; liability would result only if the
owners knew or had reason to know that their systems contained de-
famatory matter, and then failed to remove the matter within a rea-
sonable amount of time. 2 This approach most effectively balances
the concerns of fairness to both the injured party and the owner in a
period of rapid technological change.
I
Setting the Problem: Legal Traditions and Merging
Technologies
A. The New Publishing System
Computers and modern communication methods present a vari-
ety of ways to transfer fact and opinion that previously did not exist:
simply put, words are converted into a digital form that can be sent,
saved, archived, searched, and reconstituted. Moreover, these digital
constructions can be moved to a single reader or multiple readers
nearly instantaneously, or saved until the reader finds it convenient.
8. See infra notes 76-91 and accompanying text.
9. Id
10. See infra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
11. Id.
12. See infra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
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In essence, electronic publication encompasses aspects of mail, pub-
lishing, libraries, and discourse.13 This is essentially the notion of digi-
tal convergence.
14
The new technology is dependent on the interconnection of com-
puters for the sharing of information regarding schemes of electronic
publishing. 15 The technology itself is relatively straightforward. A
computer user connects her computer by private or public phone lines
to a host computer.1 6  Once connected, the user accesses whatever
services the host computer owner makes available. 17  Some services
have the look and feel of personal communications such as electronic
mail' 8 and chat services.' 9 Others have the look of publication serv-
ices. For example, newsgroups or bulletin boards present the com-
ments of readers and writers on a particular topic such as computers,
politics, or the arts.2" Finally, the host computer may provide an
archiving service, holding text and graphics files that are available for
users to transfer via the connection to their own computers. 21 Superfi-
cially, the analogies to common carrier, publisher, and librarian are
13. Anne W. Branscomb, Common Law for the Electronic Frontier; Computers, Net-
works and Public Policy, Sci. AM., Sept. 1991, at 154. Branscomb writes:
The ease with which electronic impulses can be manipulated, modified and erased
is hostile to a deliberate legal system that arose in an era of tangible things and
relies on documentary evidence to validate transactions, incriminate miscreants
and affirm contractual relations. What have been traditionally known as letters,
journals, photographs, conversations, videotapes, audiotapes and books merge
into a single stream of undifferentiated electronic impulses.
[Tlhe diversity of inputs and outputs ... makes it difficult to determine who is
author, publisher, republisher, reader or archivist.
Id.
14. POOL, supra note 1, at 189-225 (discussing electronic publication).
15. Charles, supra note 2, at 126.
16. Edward J. Naughton, Note, Is Cyberspace a Public Forum? Computer Bulletin
Boards, Free Speech, and State Action, 81 GEo. L.J. 409, 416-17 (1992); Charles, supra note
2, at 125.
17. Pool and others have noted the variety of services that can be made available
through electronic publishing. See POOL, supra note 1, at 224; Glenn Groenewold, The Net
Meets the Law; The Legalities of Information Transmission; Rules of the Game; Column,
UNIX REV., Dec. 1994, at 79 ("As a conduit for e-mail between individuals, [the Internet]
has the characteristics of a common carrier. At the other extreme, when it compiles and
transmits news, fiction, or opinion, it resembles a newspaper or magazine.").
18. Naughton, supra note 16, at 418-19; David J. Loundy, E-Law 3.0: Computer Infor-
mation Systems Law and System Operator Liability in 1995 (manuscript on file with the
author). Electronic mail generally permits the author to direct a post to a particular person
or defined group of persons designated by the sender. The newsgroup, though technologi-
cally similar to electronic mail, differs in that it has no predefined audience.
19. Loundy, supra note 18. Chat services, by immediately transferring messages
among members of a self-defined contemporaneous group, permit groups of individuals to
"converse."
20. Naughton, supra note 16, at 417; Loundy, supra note 18.
21. Naughton, supra note 16, at 417; Loundy, supra note 18.
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obvious; the host computer provides elements of each of these
activities.
Because of the digital nature of the services, they present some
novel or heightened problems for host computer operators. 2 First,
some of the services, such as bulletin boards or newsgroups, are
designed for widespread distribution or broadcast.23 Second, the ex-
tent of the initial publication and republication can be enormous due
to the potential size of the commercial service and the interconnected
nature of the communications system.24 Third, the distribution pro-
cess itself is immediate. 25  Finally, there is the complication of ano-
nymity: many authors disguise their identities, and the structure of the
networks permits this hiding.
26
Diversity of owners presents a second complication. On one end
of the spectrum are the large commercial entertainment and informa-
tion services such as CompuServe, Prodigy, LEXIS/Nexis, and Dow
Jones.27 At the other end are thousands of small commercial and am-
ateur bulletin boards.28 These thousands of boards and the steadily
22. This Article assumes that the writer or first publisher of defamatory or other tor-
tious digital work is liable. As Trotter Hardy and others have suggested, that level of publi-
cation does not appear to present a particularly novel legal problem. Hardy, supra note 3,
at 999.
23. Charles, supra note 2, at 146.
24. Prodigy, for example, claims to have two million subscribers and processes 60,000
messages a day. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229
at *3, *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). In addition, the Internet encompasses an estimated ten
million computers linked to several million users. Herb Brody, Of Bytes and Rights: Free-
dom of Expression and Electronic Communications, TECH. REv., Nov. 1992, at 22.
25. Brody, supra note 24 ("Computers linked to telecommunications networks spread
information-and misinformation-faster than it can be managed.").
26. Charles, supra note 2, at 145.
27. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Daniel v. Dow
Jones & Co., 520 N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987); Charles, supra note 2, at 124. In a
March 1995 article, Robert Charles summarized the commercial size of the larger bulletin
boards:
CCBBs [commercial computer bulletin boards] that offer access to the Net for a
fee-plus their own in-house bulletin boards and services-are flourishing. If
sales figures are any indication, CCBBs are the runaway locomotive of the 1990s.
According to Forbes Magazine, CompuServe Inc., H&R Block's subsidiary, made
74 million pretax dollars in fiscal 1993 ... and its stock quintupled since March of
1992. Likewise, Prodigy Services Inc., a partnership between IBM Corp. and
Sears-Roebuck & Co., boasts two million users and 1993 sales of $200 million.
Robert B. Charles, Beware the Spectre of Corporate On-Line Libel, AI EXPERT, Mar. 1995,
at 15.
28. Bob Brown, Electronic Bulletin Board Operators Risk Libel Suits; Laws Have Yet
to Catch Up with Technology, NETWORK WORLD, June 20, 1988, at 15; Charles, supra note
2, at 15.
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declining costs of computing2 9 suggest that entry is relatively easy.3"
On the other hand, it would also appear that few of these entrants
have the resources of the major commercial services that would be
necessary to set up screening devices.
While in theory every host computer can supervise conduct on
the machine (most simply by cutting off outside access), content con-
trol in fact varies greatly among hosts. In some systems, it is apparent
that the host attempts no control.3' In others, the system attempts to
screen for profanity by using computerized search programs that look
for questionable words.3 2 Finally, some bulletin boards manually
screen messages.33
Taken together, these new forms of publication present legal
challenges both in the United States: and internationally. 34 As ex-
pected, the authors will be liable. One defamation suit, for example,
involved a defamatory message that was placed on an office network
by an employer and read by fellow employees, resulting in a $15.5
million judgment. 35 "Flaming' 36 is another potential basis for a defa-
29. In his 1983 classic, Pool noted the phenomenal decline in the cost of computing.
POOL, supra note 1, at 227-28. If anything, that trend seems to be accelerating and. has
been abetted by the relative declining cost of long distance communications. Christopher
R. Conte, Reaching for the Phone, GOVERNING MAG., July 1995, at 32; Long-Distance
Rates Could Drop, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 29, 1995, at 1C. See, e.g., Michael Martz, GTE
Proposes Raising Local Rates, RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH, June 10, 1995, at C1. Bypass
strategies that avoid some of these costs may further encourage use of electronic publish-
ing. Bytes, DENVER PosT, July 24, 1995, at E4.
30. Naughton, supra note 16, at 434.
31. A criminal case against an MIT student whose bulletin board apparently became a
pathway for stolen software suggests the dangers inherent in an uncontrolled board. Jules
Crittenden, Ruling Clears Way for Computer Bandits, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 30, 1995, at
1; Charges Dropped Against Student, COMPUTER FRAUD & SECURITY BULL., Feb. 1995.
32. Brody, supra note 24, at 22 (Prodigy uses software to screen for obscenities).
33. Charles, supra note 2, at 126; Brody, supra note 24, at 22. Prodigy, for example,
attempted to prescreen the content of its bulletin boards in an effort to secure a marketing
position as a family-oriented safe product. Naughton, supra note 16, at 434.
34. Apart from the problems associated with domestic law, the reach of intercon-
nected systems poses problems for each nation's legal system. See, e.g., Proposed UK Libel
Law Poses Threat to Internet Service Providers, FINTECH TELECOM MARKETS, July 6, 1995.
35. Texas Jurors Award $15 Million to Employee Called a Thief, LIABILITY WK., May
3, 1993.
36. "Flaming" is a term used to describe outrageous electronic mail (e-mail). It is
often directed at neophytes that stumble over the traditions of the Internet. For a critique
of some of the effects of computerization on social intercourse, see CLIFFORD STOLL,
SILICON SNAKE OIL: SECOND THOUGHTS ON THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY (1995).
Throughout the text, Stoll gives examples of the strange and accepted goings-on in elec-
tronic commerce.
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mation law suit.37 The increased access to information via computers
presents new dangers associated with the invasion of privacy.38 The
most novel problem, however, is the liability for defamation of the
host computer's operator.
B. Defamation Law: The.Legal Structure
The goal of defamation law is to protect the reputation of the
injured person by providing a remedy for his injury.3 9  In its basic
form, it protects one's interest in relations with others:4' the key is the
plaintiff's appearance in the eyes of third parties, not the plaintiff's
perception of the defamatory words.4'
This goal of protecting reputation is carried out in the basic no-
tion of defamation and the twin torts of slander and libel.42 Actiona-
ble defamation requires a false and defamatory statement concerning
another, its nonprivileged publication to a third party through the
fault or negligence of the publisher, and some sort of recognized in-
jury.43 A plaintiff is defamed if the statement "tends so to harm [his]
reputation.., as to lower him in the estimation of the community or
to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him."44 A slan-
der generally results if the defamatory communication is oral, a libel if
it is written or broadcast.
45
37. Dana Blankenhorn, Editorial, The Law of the Modem, NEWSBYTES NEWS NET-
WORK, Mar. 26, 1993. This sort of defamation, however, does not present a special legal
problem. See Hardy, supra note 3.
38. Brown, supra note 28, at 15 (Indiana lawsuit pending against operator for re-
vealing contents of a user's e-mail message).
39. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 118 (1992); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. b (1977).
40. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 111, at
771 (5th ed. 1984).
41. Id.
42. As Prosser and Keeton have noted, the problems inherent in defamation law are
legion and have significant historical roots. Id. at 771-73, 771 n.5. These problems are well
beyond the scope of this article except as they relate to the problems associated With new
technologies and the law's reaction to them. See, e.g., iL at 787 (discussing the application
of libel and slander to broadcast).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
' 44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). For a discussion of various state-
ments found defamatory, see KEETON ET-AL., supra note 40, § 111. As the cited material
suggests, the differences revolve around what constitutes ridicule, but the differences ap-
pear to turn on situational factors such as time, place, and tone. Generally, however, there
must be some misstatement of fact, either direct or implied by a stated opinion, that results
in the defamation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 565-566.
45. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 states:
(1) Libel consists of the publication of defamatory matter by written or printed
words, by its embodiment in physical form or by any other form of communica-
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Libel and slander require a publication.' In the case of slander,
the publication is typically an oral comment to a third party. Regard-
ing libel, an intentional transfer of a writing to a third person consti-
tutes the publication. In either case, the repetition of the defamation,
directly or through an agent,47 is a republication and a separate tor-
tious act.48 As Prosser and Keeton note:
Every repetition of the defamation is a publication in itself, even
though the repeater states the source, or resorts to the customary
newspaper evasion "it is alleged," or makes it clear that he does not
himself believe the imputation. The courts have said many times
that the last utterance may do no less harm than the first, and that
the wrong of another cannot serve as an excuse to the defendant.
Likewise every one who takes part in the publication, as in the case
of the owner, editor, printer, vendor, or even carrier of a newspaper
is charged with publication, although so far as strict liability is con-
cerned the responsibility of some of these has been somewhat
relaxed.49
The republication rule, however, is tempered by the view that each
version may constitute only one defamation per publisher, regardless,
of the number of copies made.5 °
The rule is further tempered by fault requirements that vary with
the level of control exerted over content. An author, broadcaster, or
tion that has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed
words.
(2) Slander consists of the publication of defamatory matter by spoken words,
transitory gestures or by any form of communication other than those stated in
Subsection (1).
(3) The area of dissemination, the deliberate and premeditated character of its
publication and the persistence of the defamation are factors to be considered in
determining whether a publication is a libel rather than a slander.
Id. § 568. Section 568A takes the view, not accepted in all states, that a defamatory broad-
cast always results in libel. Id. § 568A. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 40, at 787. In most
situations, the appropriate theory of liability is presumably libel. In the case of chat pro-
grams, in which parties have immediate interconnection with one another and the situation
is essentially conversational, there appears to be a superficial argument that the rules of
slander, and with them the necessity to show greater damages to establish a claim, should
apply. This argument will not be addressed.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558, 577 (1977); KEETON ET AL., supra note
40, § 113; RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4.121] (1986).
47. One may be liable for defamation committed through an agent. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. f (1977); KEETON ET AL., supra note 40, § 113.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 576 (1977); SMOLLA, supra note 46,
§ 4.13[1][c].
49. KEETON ET AL., supra note 40, § 113. This definition of republication raises a re-
lated question about the effect of copying messages as part of a reply when answering e-
mail or posting a comment to a bulletin board. Conceptually, each copy might constitute
an additional republication. See SMOLLA, supra note 46, § 4.13[3]. Again, this argument is
not addressed here.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A (1977); KEETON ET AL., supra note 40,
§ 113; SMOLLA, supra note 46, § 4.13[3].
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any other direct publisher of a work, must be shown to have intention-
ally or negligently published the work.5 ' However, the liability of
other potential parts of the distribution process varies.5 2 A repub-
lisher, such as a bookstore, library, or newsstand, is liable only if it
knows or has reason to know of the work's defamatory character. 3 A
transmitter, typically a common carrier, likewise is liable only if it
knows or has reason to know of the defamatory nature of the writing.
In some cases, there is a further privilege to transmit even when the
transmitter knows of the writing's defamatory nature, as long as it has
no reason to believe that the material is not privileged. 54 Finally, the
owner of a traditional bulletin board (as in a grocery store or in a
common area of an apartment building) on which defamatory matter
is posted is not liable unless it knows or has reason to know of the
posting and fails to take action to remove the defamatory message
within a reasonable time.5
The rationale for the lower levels of liability for different parts of
the distribution process is based primarily on notions of efficiency,
fairness, and privacy. On the one hand, "[t]he composer or original
publisher of a defamatory statement, such as the author, printer or
publishing house, usually knows or can find out whether a statement
in a work produced by him is defamatory or capable of a defamatory
import. ' 56 The vendor or library, however, lacks the ability to sort
through the volumes of text to locate defamatory material.57 Like-
wise, because the common carrier owes a duty to carry the messages
of all patrons and must respect their privacy, it would face an unfair
and intolerable burden if required to check each item.58 The bulletin
board owner is in a similar position in that it makes its space available
without apparent controls and may lack the day-to-day review that is
available to other publishers.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. k (1977). Thus, an accidental re-
publication, if not negligent, does not render the defendant liable. Id. cmt. o. The liability
of a broadcaster is described separately. Id. § 581.
52. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 40, § 113; Joseph P. Thornton et al., Vide-
otex Symposium: Libel, 36 FED. COMM. L.J. 178, 180 (1984).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (1977).
54. Id. §§ 581(1), 612(2); SMOLLA, supra note 46, § 4.13[31 and cases cited in notes;
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Tort Liability, the First Amendment, and Equal Access to Electronic
Networks, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65, 102 (1992); Charles, supra note 2, at 132.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2), § 577 cnit. p; KEETON ET AL., supra
note 40, § 113; SMOLLA, supra note 46, § 4.12[5] and cases cited therein. But see Perritt,
supra note 54, at 99 n.164, for a different description of the liability and case holdings.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 cmt. c (1977).
57. Hardy, supra note 3, at 1003.
58. Charles, supra note 2, at 143; Loundy, supra note 18.
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The law's recognition of a sliding standard of liability depending
on the amount of control exerted by each member in the chain of
distribution presents a novel problem for electronic publishing. The
medium raises the possibility that the owner of the host computer may
be liable for significant damages due to the widespread scope of the
systems and the limited ability of the owner to police content. It is
further raised by the network culture itself, one that seems to en-
courage outrageous behavior on the part of its participants. The
owner of the host computer, therefore, faces potentially significant lia-
bility due to the actions of third parties. The level of that liability,
however, is uncertain because it is not clear which role the host com-
puter owner is playing.
C. The Courts' Analogical Approach to Computer Services
Faced with the new medium of electronic publishing and a multi-
tude of standards, the courts in two reported cases have drawn analo-,
gies to prior technology in assigning liability for defamation. The
cases, which involved the posting of allegedly defamatory material on
computer bulletin boards, forced the courts to consider the defendants
either publishers or secondary publishers. In each case, the degree of
control exercised by the host computer owner tipped the issues of effi-
ciency and fairness to one side or the other.
One decision, which examined the liability of a bulletin board for
posting an allegedly defamatory message, treated the host computer
owner as a secondary publisher. In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.,5
9
CompuServe utilized a computer forum to publish the report of a
third party vendor that allegedly defamed a competing business.
CompuServe asserted that an independent contractor prepared and
placed the work on its system without editorial review by Com-
puServe. The trial court, on a motion for summary judgment, viewed
CompuServe as a secondary publisher and dismissed the action be-
cause the plaintiff did not show that CompuServe knew or had reason
to know the defamatory nature of the newsletter. Among the factors
the court focused on in analogizing CompuServe to a secondary pub-
lisher was the lack of editorial control exerted.60 Based on this lack of
control, the court found that CompuServe was "in essence an elec-
tronic, for-profit library that carries a vast number of publications and
collects usage and membership fees from its subscribers in return for
59. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
60. Id. at 140. The alternative, comparing CompuServe to a publisher, would have
been unreasonable given the company's size and the potential chilling effect on the distri-
bution of information. Id. at 139-40 (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959))..
[Vol. 18:267
access to the publications."' 61 The court complemented its rationale
by noting the speed at which materials are added to the system due to
its digital nature.62
A 1995 New York trial court decision suggests another possible
analogy. In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,63 an in-
vestment bank sued for damages allegedly resulting from a flame
posted on the defendant's investment bulletin board. In contrast to
the facts of Cubby, the plaintiff in this case alleged that the host main-
tained some editorial control over the content of its bulletin boards
through content guidelines to customers, software screening, manual
screening by board leaders, and the use of an emergency message de-
leting function. 64 The court, based on this evidence of control, distin-
guished Cubby and concluded that the defendant, Prodigy, acted as a
primary publisher when it held itself out as retaining editorial control
and implemented that control through software and guidelines.65 The
court concluded that increased exposure to defamation liability is the
cost for the editorial control Prodigy exercised to promote itself as a
family-oriented service.66
In the little case, law available, the trend is evident: attempts to
control content will result in greater potential liability.67 Services will
move up the scale from either mere transmitters or secondary publish-
ers to publishers as they exert greater editorial responsibility over the
content of the files found on their systems. This result flows directly
from the view that defamation on a computer network is analogous to
traditional print materials.
D. Problems with the Analogical Approach
Although the analogical approach used in Cubby and Stratton
Oakmont is a perfectly understandable means of developing the law in
this area, it presents significant analytical problems. First, the catego-
ries used in the analogies are not likely to hold up over time. Second,
the factual premises of the categorizations are flawed. Finally, in an
industry in which technological merger is the norm, the analogical ap-
proach sends odd signals to service providers.
61.. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140.
'62. Id
63. 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (May 26, 1995).
64. ld at *3-4.
65. Id. at *8-10.
66. Id at *13.
67. For an extended discussion of the significance of control in defamation standards
at different points in the publication process, see Perritt, supra note 54, at 66, 110-11.
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The basic categorization used by courts in defamation law is pre-
mised on the control of the impressions or copies, and the ability to
screen their content. Essentially, this approach views liability as the
control of atoms, rather than ideas.68 The person who transmits the
ideas initially, or who formats them for mass distribution either on
paper or through broadcast, 69 is principally responsible for either the
intentional or negligent distribution of the work. A transmitter or sec-
ondary publisher, however, has little or no control over the form, and
the liability therefore decreases, even though the ideas that caused the
harm are the same.
Merging such media, however, makes these distinctions question-
able. The computer service acts as publisher, distributor, and as part
of the transmission process. 70 The service takes on characteristics of
both broadcast and common carrier.7' Indeed, it seems logical that
one service could take on several different roles simultaneously-di-
recting composition, serving as a public bulletin board, and permitting
real time debate.72 As a result, the boards face indeterminate legal
liability,73 and further change renders the legal approach unstable.
Additionally, the factual premises of the courts' divisions are
flawed. As suggested by Cubby and Stratton Oakmont, the courts
have sought to determine if the computer service acted as a publisher
by reviewing content. Instead of determining liability from what the
services could be doing, the courts instead measured the defendants
by their current practices. This approach suffers in two ways. First,
even at the lowest levels of liability for transmitters and secondary
publishers, there is liability for "reason to know. '74 Thus, it is clearly
relevant that software and manual review are possible. In Cubby,
however, these tools were not relevant to the outcome. Similarly, the
limits of these tools, given the enormous number of postings and the
lack of adequate ways to check content, were apparently irrelevant in
Stratton Oakmont. In essence, there is no sensitivity in these decisions
to either side of the problem.
The second factual problem is the lack of sensitivity to the differ-
ences in services. Just as merger presents a challenge to the very sta-
68. For a related discussion on the challenges presented by digitization, see NICHOLAS
NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 11-85 (1995).
69. In defamation, once again, the analogy is to libel rather than slander because pa-
per and tape last longer and have wider impact than spoken words.
70. POOL, supra note 1, at 197; Perritt, supra note 54, at 67.
71. Charles, supra note 2, at 136; Naughton, supra note 16, at 412-13.
72. See supra notes 13-38 and accompanying text.
73. PooL, supra note 1, at 233; Groenewold, supra note 17, at 79.
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2) (1977).
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bility of the approach, the various levels of potential service provision,
from small amateur entrants to large commercial services,75 raise seri-
ous questions about the courts' ability to properly assess liability using
a one-size-fits-all rule.
Finally, the analogical approach sets up some rather bizarre in-
centives for service providers. The test essentially imposed by the
courts is whether a service reviewed content. The courts ignore, par-
ticularly in Cubby, whether the provider is able to provide the content
review. The distinction between publishers and secondary publishers
rests, however, on whether it is fair and practical to hold a particular
party to that responsibility. For the initial publisher who sets the type
and checks the content, the duty exists. For others further down the
distribution chain with fewer resources, such as booksellers and librar-
ies, there is no duty. In contrast, the courts have cast the duty in terms
of what the parties decided to do, rather than determining what they
should do based on their ability to review and screen content for de-
famatory material. The courts' approach thus sets up a perverse in-
centive to do nothing.
7 6
These problems are fundamental to the analogical approach to
defining defamation liability. The approach is unstable, factually
flawed, and in application creates perverse incentives. Thus, it makes
sense to look for potential alternatives.
II
Alternative Models in Assigning Liability in
Defamation Cases
The criticism of Cubby and Stratton Oakmont suggests that a
workable approach for assigning defamation liability to a host com-
puter owner should reconcile concerns for stability, recognize the pos-
sible differences in the technology, and be fair. Among the
alternatives are the use of a single, flexible standard, such as negli-
gence or strict liability, or resort to another regulatory construct that
appears to be superficially related to the problem. Each of these al-
ternatives, however, presents distinct problems.
A. A Negligence Standard
One alternative is to assign a duty of reasonable care to the host
computer owner. Under a negligence standard, the required degree
of care would adjust to the problem and the nature of the technol-
75. Hardy, supra note 3, at 1003; Naughton, supra note 16, at 437-38.
76. Prodigy on Trial, ADVERTISING AGE, June 5, 1995, at 20.
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ogy.77 A court would as a result be able to balance injury prevention
with the cost of preventing that lOSS. 78 This standard of care might be
augmented with specific rules defining the appropriate levels of action
by the host computer owner.79 For example, one author, Robert
Charles, has suggested that owners be required to maintain names and
addresses of users, warn subscribers, review messages in a public
space within a reasonable amount of time, remove messages if the
owner knows or has reason to know that the message is defamatory,
and remain liable if it knowingly or negligently transmits a message
that it knows or has reason to know is defamatory.8 0
As in the decided cases, this approach attempts to balance con-
flicting values. Plainly, there is a sense that innocent third parties
need a higher degree of protection than that providedby a "knowing"
standard. The danger, which Charles attempts to address through a
series of specific rules, is the chilling that an undefined and undefina-
ble duty of care would likely cause. Courts, whose methods of apply-
ing analogies in this area are already suspect, then would be left to
divine the appropriate balance. Even with specific rules, there is
likely to be some chilling effect on board ownership or usage since
standards of liability are unclear and will probably remain so.
The second problem is that the particular prescriptions to avoid
liability appear to be unrealistic. Verification of each user would be
nearly impossible even in commercial systems, and truly impossible
for amateur systems. The degree of telephone and credit card fraud
that currently exists suggests that basic security of the sort suggested
by Charles is not possible.8 1 Warnings, likewise, do not prevent those
willing to defame from defaming. The warning is no more than what a
normally responsible person would be expected to know, and that
knowledge does not currently prevent a lack of civility. The remain-
der of the prescriptions to avoid liability are premised on constant
review of messages in public spaces. Plainly if a service as large as
Prodigy cannot protect its space from defamatory messages, it is un-
77. This alternative is similar to the scheme of multiple rules, applied to landowners
and dependent on the status of the injured party, which has been rejected in favor of a
standardized, if vague, general duty of care to maintain a premises.
78. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 6.1-6.2, 147-52 (3d ed.
1986).
79. Charles, supra note 2, at 147.
80. Id. at 147-48.
81. Cheryl Phillips, Cracking Down on Fake IDs: States Turn to High-Tech to Fight
Fraud, USA TODAY, July 13, 1995, at IA; Brian McWilliams, Financial Insecurity, COM-
PUTERWORLD, June 26, 1995, at 79; Telephone Fraud: Nearly One in Five Californians
Have Been Fraud Victims According to Just-Released AT&T Survey, EDGE, July 3, 1995;
Fraud Pervasive, Yet Largely Undefined, ILL. LEG. TIMES, June 1995, at 1.
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likely that any other service could either. In sum, the solution is
unworkable.
Finally, Charles' solution eventually resolves itself into a "know
or reason to know" requirement that is likely to generate the same
concerns that result from the current case law.82 A reason to know
standard, with some modifications, might be correct, but the current
interpretation is suspect.83 Thus, as a means of protecting the inter-
ests of injured parties, it is not a strong solution.
B. A Strict Liability Standard
A second approach, offered by Trotter Hardy, is to assign to the
host computer-owner strict liability for defamation:' the owner would
be liable for any defamation appearing on its system.85 Such an ap-
proach addresses the uncertainty of identifiable and solvent defend-
ants and the ability of the services to take precautions.8 6 The effect is
to force owners to decide the amount of risk they are willing to incur
and structure their services accordingly.87 Additionally, Hardy argues
that a further benefit is derived from the owner's ability to spread the
risk of loss through its fee structure. 8
While this approach is superficially more stable, its likely effect is
less certain. First, the courts may shift the "fault" questions into other
areas of concern, such as the determination of whether the statement
is defamatory.8 9 Second, there are problems with First Amendment
law. Under the First Amendment, a defendant may not be liable for
defamation without a showing of fault of some sort.9 The rationale
for this fault requirement is to prevent the chilling effect of defama-
tion on a highly protected activity. Strict liability would have that chil-
ling effect. Finally, there is a fundamental flaw in the approach. As
Hardy explains, the ability of a strict liability system to work depends
on the owner's ability to seek indemnification from the parties causing
the loss.9 1 Anonymity and the speed by which messages transfer and
are replicated, however, make this prospect unlikely. Access to net-
82. Charles, supra note 2, at 148.
83. See supra notes 59-76 and accompanying text.





89. Prosser and Keeton have noted that the doctrine of defamation already suffers
because courts are uncomfortable in this area and have devised numerous and often inco-
herent rules as a result. KEETON ET AL., supra note 40, § 111.
90. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
91. Hardy, supra note 3, at 1045.
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works is so open that the writers may not be located. Replication and
repetition may make indemnification a process of hide and seek with
no end.
C. First Amendment Analogues
A final approach that might be argued for setting content regula-
tion (though not necessarily the degree of fault) is the public regula-
tion of the media under the First Amendment. As Pool noted in his
classic work, a three-tiered system of regulation has emerged in the
regulation of content in the media.92 While print is relatively unregu-
lated, both common carriers, due to their economic monopoly over
access, and broadcast due to the physical scarcity of electronic spectra,
have been subject to government regulation of either access, prices, or
content.9 3 Pool and Smolla, however, correctly conclude that content
regulation other than that which assures access to competing voices is
outside the justification based on scarcity.94
Even if it were relevant, the analogy to broadcast or common car-
rier would likely prove unstable in a time of merging technologies. At
this point the reasoning is redundant: the owner is both publisher,
broadcaster, and common carrier.95 There is no particular standard
that applies.
Finally, the whole approach assumes scarcity, and that simply is
not the case. Bandwidth or spectrum is not a justification for content
regulation.96 Moreover, there are literally thousands of hosts from
which to choose.9 7 While there may be information niches that turn
into natural monopolies, merger suggests that there are unrestricted
paths that may result in alternatives that sweep around these niches.98
Content regulation, based on protecting audiences, should also be
unavailing. In broadcast, for example, the United States Supreme
Court has recognized the authority of the Federal Communications
Commission to regulate indecent speech to protect children and cap-
tive audiences.99 When the customer initiates the contact or has
means to block the offensive message, however, the concern for audi-
92. POOL, supra note 1, at 233.
93. Id. at 234-40.
94. Id. at 230; SMOLLA, supra note 39, at 326-27.
95. POOL, supra note 1, at 233.
96. Id. at 236; SMOLLA, supra note 39, at 327 (scarcities change with technology and
cannot be reliably predicted).
97. See supra notes 13-38 and accompanying text.
98. POOL, supra note 1, at 211-12.
99. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 727 (1978).
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ence protection is negated."°° In the case of computer services, the
most such balancing justifies is a very low level of content regulation.
Alternatives, such as warnings and customer initiated blocking, are
the more consistent alternatives.
Just as the suggestions of a particular level of liability prove inap-
propriate, so does the attempt to construct a set of rules from media
regulation. Simply put, neither the technology nor the reasoning pro-
vides a sound basis for divining the right set of rules. The solution
must necessarily be found by deciding how compensation can be af-
forded in a manner that is consistent with the technology and the un-
derlying values of open communications and fair compensation.
Inl
Finding the Appropriate Balance
A. Important Goals of a Compensation System and Factual Assumptions
As the prior discussion suggests, there are several factors impor-
tant to defining the appropriate level of liability. First, the rule should
be constitutional both in its technical and philosophical approach. It
makes little sense to suggest a rule that either fails to correspond with
the appropriate constitutional standard or rests on policies that are
contrary to constitutional doctrine. 01 Thus, some level of fault is re-
quired before an owner can be found liable for defamation, and the
policy itself should have the least chilling impact in light of the need to
afford compensation.
Second, the standard should provide a stable guide to the indus-
try. In this regard, the standard should be understandable and pro-
vide a consistent set of instructions. The alternative, a highly flexible
standard, might seem appropriate, but it would lead to the high level
of uncertainty inherent in a changing environment and present the
courts with difficult factual questions they seem ill-equipped to
answer.1
0 2
100. Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989); MICHAEL K. KEL-
LOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 780-86 (1992); SMOLLA, supra note
39, at 328-31.
101. The strict liability approach offered by Hardy suffers from this problem in particu-
lar. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text. Likewise, direct content regulation is
unwarranted. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
102. Note that even in the negligence standard suggested by Charles there is an attempt
to specifically define behaviors that would constitute due care. See supra notes 77-91 and
accompanying text.
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Third, the solution should be consistent with the factual back-
ground. It should limit liability to steps which are possible. Simply
put, the solution should be practical.
Finally, the effect of the rule should be fair. It should not provide
a perverse incentive for owners to allow harm in order to prevent lia-
bility.' °3 Moreover, the rule should compensate for real injuries that
are neither under-valued nor over-valued. The rule should not under-
value injuries by being too lenient and thus potentially injure any
sense of community norms developing in computer networks."° At
the same time, the rule should recognize the wild and cantankerous
nature of current networks. In this sense, the rule should not over-
value claims because they occur in a situation in which some license is
the norm. Indeed, there is a sense that these are the radical technolo-
gies of the times.0 5
B. A Notice-Plus Standard
Taken together, these four concerns warrant a relatively high hur-
dle before liability can be assigned to the host computer owner. Mini-
mally, the owner should know or have reason to know that the
publication is defamatory, and either transmit or fail to remove it. In
a sense, then, the current Cubby standard is relevant as a starting
point, but in fact a higher standard, like that of the traditional bulletin
board or property owner, provides the more exacting and appropriate
level of fault. This high showing is justified by constitutional concerns,
the need to provide a stable rule, and the need for practicality and
fairness.
First, the rule provides a constitutional basis for finding liability
because it requires a showing of fault before imposing damages. In
this situation, a relatively high level of fault may be required to satisfy
other important concerns discussed below. Moreover, the high level
of fault is consistent with constitutional goals of maintaining a vigor-
ous communication system. The networks are essentially taking the
role of the press and the soapbox and should be afforded similar con-
stitutional deference. The fact that they also serve common carrier
and broadcast functions does not warrant a lower level of protection
since neither access nor surprise of a captive audience is at issue.
1°6
103. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
104. Smolla makes a similar point in discussing the role of content regulation and the
underlining rationale for some checks on outrageous behavior. SMOLLA, supra note 39, at
331.
105. POOL, supra note 1, at 226-51.
106. The broad-based access that bulletin boards present their users also warrants a
constitutionally high level of protection. An analogy to defamation law that is related to
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Second, this approach is likely to prove more stable than either
the application of a negligence rule or a simple reason-to-know stan-
dard. A negligence rule by definition is highly flexible; it changes with
what is reasonable under the particular circumstances. Properly ap-
plied, a-simple reason-to-knoW standard offers a more direct path, and
might offer a good accommodation, but allows for a perverse incen-
tive and may suggest to courts a duty to set up screening devices. The
latter concern for small boards is not practical, and for large boards
may not be effective. The solution is to create a reason to know stan-
dard that requires some notice and opportunity for the owner to re-
spond within a reasonable time.
Third, the approach is factually sound. Small board owners have
few messages, but apparently lack the capability to screen. Large
board owners have the capability to screen, but cannot keep up with
the abundance of files moving through their systems. By moving to a
notice-and-remove system of liability, the host computer owner can
more properly arrange its affairs to suit the market it wants to serve.
In particular, large owners can set up detailed systems of review (as
Prodigy allegedly did in attempting to make itself a family-oriented
service), but when they do, they also accept the risk of infuriating
some customers by removing defamatory material prior to complaint.
Customers, on the other hand, will become aware that they have some
responsibility to police the system if they want to develop a higher
level of discourse in a particular forum. Only when the owner finds a
problem statement or a customer brings a defamatory statement to
the owner's attention, and the owner fails to react within a reasonable
time, would there be liability.
An interesting side benefit to this approach is that it solves the
problem of the anonymous post. The owner would not be saddled
with the impossible task of identifying and verifying each person using
the system in an attempt to find some sort of indemnification. Rather,
the rule establishes liability only if the board owner fails to take action
on notice. It is the owner's fault that is being assessed.
Finally, the approach offers a fair compensation rule. It does not
create a perverse incentive to avoid taking action. Rather, it defines a
different standard based on the unique characteristics of the owner's
public figures is appropriate here. Public figures face a higher hurdle to establish liability,
in part because the defamed party has access to the media. See generally KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 40, § 113. By the same argument, someone defamed on a bulletin board has
nearly immediate and complete opportunity to respond. Given this ability, the defamed
party should expect to face a higher level of fault, ie. a knowing failure on the part of the
host computer owner to dispose of the offending message.
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position in the chain of distribution and the merger of several differ-
ent communications functions into a single entity. It also allows the
market to determine the appropriate level of self-regulation that own-
ers should undertake. If owners wish to capture a niche as a safe ha-
ven, they can do so if they can find customers willing to pay the
service prices. On the other hand, owners who do not censor still
must remain vigilant for complaints from customers alleging that they
or others have been defamed. There is no duty to snoop or censor,
but on open bulletin boards, the approach does not declare open sea-
son on the truth. Thus, injured third parties have a remedy, but it is
practical, tied to fault, and based upon constitutional considerations
that warrant constraint on the rule.
IV
Conclusion
Finding a balance, when the basic structure of the problem ap-
pears fluid, is no small task. Yet the value system for determining the
liability of a host computer owner points to a relatively high threshold
of liability. Other standards may be used, but they are either uncer-
tain, unstable, or unconstitutional. In contrast, a notice and duty-to-
remove standard balances the interest in compensation with the vari-
ety of players and the complexity of the system in which the players
operate. Moreover, such a standard comports with constitutional and
network community standards. It may permit some outrageous be-
havior, but the standard provides an effective check when such behav-
ior becomes injurious.
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